Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century

A Monograph
by
MAJ Kelly H. Smith
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 05-06

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMS No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM- YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
25-05-2006	**MONOGRAPH**	**SEPT 2005-MAR 2006**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)
Major Kelly H. Smith

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

***5e.* TASK NUMBER**

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
School of Advanced Military Studies
250 Gibbon Ave
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Command and General Staff College
1 Reynolds Ave
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
CGSC, SAMS

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

This monograph seeks to determine the adequacy of national security guidance for the use of surrogate forces in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives. The insufficiency in the current guidance for waging warfare by, with, and through surrogate forces requires development of an updated approach to maximize the strategic options available to the United States.

The methodology of this paper is to review the role of strategy, policy, and doctrine in light of the existing definitions relevant to the use of foreign forces in U.S. operations. U.S. doctrinal guidance is compared to the contemporary operations involving surrogate forces. A comprehensive concept for surrogate warfare is proposed as a more effective way to conduct operations with foreign partners of all types.

The current tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or conventional versus unconventional is of little value in developing guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. operations that involve non-U.S. forces.

The 21st Century operating environment will present increasingly complex strategic situations. A more effective use of surrogate forces greatly enhances both the capability and the capacity of the United States to protect its interests in this demanding environment.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
surrogate warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, special operations forces

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17 LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19B. TELEPHONE. NUMBER *(Include area code)*
(U)	**(U)**	**(U)**	**(U)**	48	(913) 758-3300

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Kelly H. Smith

Title of Monograph: Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century

Approved by:

_____ Monograph Director
Richard D. Newton, MMAS

_____ Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR School of Advanced Military Studies

_____ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs

Abstract

Surrogate Warfare for the 21st Century by MAJ Kelly H. Smith, U.S. Army, 45 pages.

This monograph seeks to determine the adequacy of national security strategies, policies, and doctrine for the use of surrogate forces in pursuit of U.S. strategic objectives. The insufficiency in the current guidance for waging warfare by, with, and through surrogate forces requires development of an updated approach to maximize the strategic options available to the United States.

The methodology of this paper is to review the role of strategy, policy, and doctrine in light of the existing definitions relevant to the use of foreign forces in U.S. operations. This leads to a more detailed review of foreign internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine. This doctrinal guidance is compared to the contemporary operations involving surrogate forces. A comprehensive concept for surrogate warfare is proposed as a more effective way to conduct operations with foreign partners of all types.

The current tendency to categorize warfare as regular versus irregular, or conventional versus unconventional is of little value in developing guidance for U.S. military operations involving surrogate forces. Surrogate warfare provides a framework that encompasses all U.S. operations that involve non-U.S. forces. This framework also provides an analysis of the surrogate warfare environment to determine the appropriate role of both conventional and special operations forces in conducting surrogate warfare operations.

The 21st Century operating environment will present diverse threats and increasingly complex strategic situations. A more effective use of surrogate forces greatly enhances both the capability and the capacity of the United States to protect its interests in this demanding environment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War three images stand in stark contrast that highlight the nature of warfare in the contemporary world. In 1991, the United States led a coalition of heavy, conventional forces in a brilliant display of joint, coalition warfare to defeat the Iraqi Army in 100 hours.[1] The second image is of small teams of Special Forces, riding horses through the mountains of Afghanistan with the indigenous fighters of the Northern Alliance, directing technologically advanced airpower against the Taliban and taking control of the country in a few short months.[2] The final image is the current situation in Iraq, in which, Special Forces and conventional forces are working to train and employ an Iraqi military and paramilitary force capable of conducting counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.[3]

The diversity of warfare illustrated by these images has not been lost on the modern, professional military of the United States. The U.S. military has continued to evolve its policy, strategy and doctrine on the facets of war that are important today. This evolution contains a pendulous quality, swinging between "Small Wars" and major combat operations. One of the outcomes of this progression is the emergence of two categories of warfare: regular and irregular. The question that emerges is: does this framework sufficiently facilitate the development of strategy, policy, and doctrine for the United States to be effective in the contemporary environment. The answer is no, the current U.S. understanding of irregular warfare is not adequate to describe the utilization of indigenous forces in pursuit of U.S. policy objectives.

The U.S. military has undertaken significant efforts to transform its organizations and its understanding of the operational environment since the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, U.S. strategy and doctrine has not emphasized nor updated the growing role of indigenous fighters in

---

[1] H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take A Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 470.

[2] Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 153-177.

[3] Gina Cavallaro, "Small teams, Big Job," *The Army Times*, 6 February 2006, 8-10.

support of U.S. national goals. Most of the intellectual work with regard to this arena has been left to the special operations community. This paper seeks to raise the discussion of the role of non-U.S., surrogate forces to a broader audience in order to develop a more comprehensive approach.

The analyses conducted by both the Army and the joint community to provide strategic context to the contemporary strategic setting, describe a world markedly different from the bi-polar world that existed during the development of most doctrinal documents.[4] In Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM) view of the strategic setting they clearly point out that the perception of the future is that, "[t]he United States lacks commitment over time. U.S. military operations are sensitive to collateral damage; they employ indigenous groups for close combat; and they are of short duration."[5] The strategic importance of getting it right, with respect to the use of indigenous surrogates, requires that the debate concerning the use of these groups be broadened beyond the domain of special operations.

There is a debate about the impact on the Army of nearly four years of continuous deployment in the War on Terror. The concern over whether such a level of commitment is straining the Army highlights another relevant aspect to the study of the use of non-U.S. forces. Specifically, the increased use of surrogate partners can share the operational burden carried by U.S. forces. Part of the issue is whether the high operations tempo the Army is maintaining as a result of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere will negatively affect the army. The more critical point is the fact that the current deployments in OEF/OIF combined with the associated requirements to sustain significant force levels significantly limits the amount of U.S. combat power available at any given point in time. The combination of high demands for troops in existing operations and fewer units available for contingencies, increases the likelihood that the

[4] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2020 and Beyond,* (USJFCOM J2: August 2005), 4-10.

[5] Ibid., 74.

United States will rely on alliances, coalition partners, and other nations to achieve its national policy goals.

The size of U.S. military forces committed to contingency operations will not escape the attention of adversaries. The ability of the United States military to deter threats and decisively defeat those threats if deterrence fails is one of the fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy.[6] Potential enemies may conclude that the U.S. capability for deterrence and decisive victory will diminish with additional commitments of U.S. regular forces.

The global political environment has changed since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The debate about the number of soldiers involved in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, the cost of sustaining the large force, and questions about the appropriateness of any soldiers being in Iraq is a significant factor that influences any potential future decision about committing U.S. military power.[7] In many cases the U.S. political leadership may not have the option of deploying conventional forces to solve a crisis. Political factors will raise the importance of employing indigenous and partner forces in our future military operations.

The complexity of the contemporary environment, the level of engagement of U.S. forces around the globe, and the political sensitivity of committing large number of U.S. soldiers all make it necessary to reevaluate how the United States conducts operations, "by, with, and through" outside forces.[8] An indirect approach, using surrogate forces, to the nation's military problems is the focus of this paper.

The framework of this paper consists of three main components. The first of which is to establish a sense of meaning and context to the conduct of military operations using non-U.S. forces. The intent of this paper is not to describe tactical problems, but rather address the nature

---

[6] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2003), 29.

[7] Derrick Z. Jackson, "Bush Follows Johnson's Logic," *The Boston Globe,* 22 March 2006, E1.

[8] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations,* (Ft. Bragg, North Carolina: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, June 2001), 2-1.

of the issue at the level of military policy. Therefore, the initial step is to describe the nature of strategy, doctrine and policy and how these three concepts are related to each other. This will then permit a discussion of the current U.S. understanding of irregular warfare and associated concepts (e.g. unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare). Such background will serve as the foundation for a review of current unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine.

The second component examines a set of contemporary military operations conducted "by, with, and through" non-U.S. forces. By exploring the relationship between the doctrinal understanding of these types of operations and the realities faced in the operational setting, deficiencies in our current policies can be illuminated for analysis.

The final element is to refine the U.S. approach to using indigenous forces in support of U.S. policy objectives. This includes the advancement of the concept of surrogate warfare, as an approach that is broader than a SOF perspective. Additionally, this section will develop a set of criteria for evaluating the surrogate operation and assigning responsibility to the appropriate force. The analysis will provide a series of recommendations targeted at the national military level.

Chapter 2: IRREGULAR WARFARE

In order to address the adequacy or inadequacy of U.S. irregular warfare policy, one must develop an understanding of the nature of national security policy in general and then as it relates to irregular warfare. The military profession has its own particular language and demands an examination of the military meaning of terms and ideas, especially as they relate to national security policy. The challenges of understanding policy and its associates, strategy and doctrine, are compounded by the ambiguities of irregular warfare. Defining terms, reviewing the doctrine, and examining contemporary operations that involved surrogate forces will provide an understanding of irregular warfare. This understanding will be the point of departure for introducing a new approach to surrogate warfare.

Strategy, Policy, and Doctrine

The magnitude of change, from the Cold War environment to the War on Terror, requires a holistic approach to developing new solutions. This is evidenced by the wide spread discussions in the military of transformation, and "revolutions in military affairs."[9] The preferred approach to successful adaptation is to establish a coherent framework of strategy, policy and doctrine.

This is not an easy task for two major reasons. First, the definitions of and the relationships between policy, strategy, and doctrine are not without ambiguity. Second, defense policy is not created in a vacuum, but rather is one element of a complex relationship of competing national interests and parties.

[9] Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox, "Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare," *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050,* edited by Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.

Strategy is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as the, "art of war or military deployment…plan of action."[10] While perhaps adequate for general conversation, this definition is not adequately precise for military discussion. The military's dictionary, JP 1-02, defines strategy as, "the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."[11] It further clarifies military strategy by limiting the definition to the military power of the nation through the use or threat of force.[12] Some prominent military scholars have explored the nature of strategy in a more thorough manner. The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, describes strategy as, "the use of engagements for the object of war."[13] This seems to narrow the definition to those plans and actions involved in the actual conduct of warfare. A hundred years after Clausewitz, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart advanced the definition to one closer to the joint definition by linking military means to policy objectives.[14] The common thread among the various definitions of strategy is the relationship between power and policy goals. This connection is the link between strategy and policy.

Policy, its goals, and what it means is therefore critical to the development of strategy However, JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, does not contain a definition of policy. The starting point for understanding necessarily reverts back to the Oxford Dictionary. Here, policy is a "course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government."[15] The question of defense policy in particular needs a better definition. A more focused effort, by an author on politics and international relations, characterized U.S. defense policy as, "essentially instrumental and is directed towards the negation of external threats and

[10] Frank R. Abate, editor, *Oxford Pocket Dictionary and Thesaurus,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 790.

[11] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* (Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 21 August 2005), 511.

[12] Ibid., 340.

[13] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128.

[14] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Faber and Faber, 1946) 335.

[15] Frank R. Abate, 610.

the fulfillment of national objectives by military means."[16] This definition is largely redundant with the Oxford Dictionary definition of strategy, yet it does add the concept of an external threat. Robert Barnett, in his study on national level strategy, maintains the requirement for policy to exist in a determinate security environment. However, he clarifies the difference between strategy and policy. Strategy is the mechanism to operationalize policy objectives under the conditions also articulated in policy.[17] If in general, policy provides objectives, and strategy seeks to accomplish these objectives, it is doctrine that describes how to accomplish the objectives.

Doctrine can also be analyzed by moving from the general to the particular. The Oxford offering is that doctrine is, "what is taught; body of instruction."[18] The joint dictionary brings the notion of doctrine more in line with the strategy and policy discussion by defining doctrine as, "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[19] A practical understanding of doctrine is that it describes what actions are to be employed and how to conduct them.[20]

A potential model for understanding the complex relationship between doctrine, policy and strategy, would be to start with the concept that is most distinguishable. Doctrine, it would seem, provides a set of options or capabilities for the strategist to arrange in order to accomplish objectives set out in policy. Doctrine also suggests preferred techniques for conducting military action. One problem with this model is the premise that policy is the source of the goals and objectives strategy seeks to accomplish. A review of the strategy documents of the United States

---

[16] G.M. Dillon, *Defence Policy a Comparative Analysis,* (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1988) 53.

[17] Robert W. Barnett, *The Sinews of National Military Strategy,* (Boston, MA: United States Strategic Institute, 1994). 2-14.

[18] Frank R. Abate, 222.

[19] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP1-02,* 168.

[20] Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare,* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 12.

indicates that goals originate in strategy. The foremost strategy document, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, "seeks instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom" and lays out the additional goals of, "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity."[21] These words form the beginning of the foundational strategy for the United States and have the ring of policy in the sense that they are establishing guiding principles and objectives. This is congruent with Barnett's explanation that policy's function of identifying objectives provides the "what" and strategy determines the "how."[22] What becomes apparent then, is that there are elements of both strategy and policy in the same document; one has to consider the function of the statement to determine its nature.

This close interaction between elements defies attempts to establish a linear or one-dimensional relationship, as in our initial model. Rather, policy, strategy, and doctrine overlap each other, in Venn diagram fashion, establishing a complex relationship in which each is dependent upon the others in order to be complete, even in itself."[23] The result is not three separate elements, but a compound. In turn each component; strategy, policy, and doctrine are also combinations of various elements. For example, military policy does not exist in a vacuum, but is a complex combination of the nation's foreign, domestic and economic policies.[24] In the interest of brevity and simplicity the term "guidance" will refer to policy, strategy and doctrine as a collective and the specific term will be used when it is being referred to in the particular

As with any complex system then, establishing desired change in the system requires the modification of more than one piece of the system. Therefore, the determination of how the United States is going to address the use of and defense against irregular warfare in the contemporary environment requires a holistic approach to change its national irregular warfare

[21] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, I, 1.
[22] Robert W. Barnett, 7.
[23] Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 21.
[24] G.M. Dillon, 53.

guidance. Additionally, the concept of irregular warfare has to be examined in order to establish a foundation for future recommendations.

Irregular Warfare versus Unconventional Warfare

Google searches of irregular warfare and unconventional warfare each yield over a half-million returns. Unfortunately, the prolific usage of these terms does not equate to a consensus on their meaning. The current transformation of the U.S. Department of Defense is partially a result of the challenges in confronting an uncertain operational environment, which includes conflict significantly different than massed formations of standing armies.[25] A better understanding of the irregular warfare dilemma requires a study of the meaning of key terms, a review of the existing doctrine, and finally an analysis of contemporary operations in light of the definitions and doctrine.

Definitions

One of the challenges of improving the policy apparatus with respect to irregular warfare is that the concept is itself often either vague or imprecise. Throughout history, and the study of the military arts, countless terms have been used -- in some cases synonymously and in other cases not -- with irregular warfare. The idea of something other than a regular force in conventional combat can be captured with terms like: irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, and asymmetric warfare. These types of warfare are defined primarily by the nature of the fighting forces and to some extent by the tactics they employ.

The most encompassing category is irregular forces, defined in joint doctrine as, "armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal

[25] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2020 and Beyond, 9*.

security forces."[26] The irregular is most closely associated with the guerrilla and guerrilla warfare. The irregular fighter and the guerrilla are even circularly defined in the joint dictionary, because guerrilla warfare is essentially irregular warfare in which the fighters are organized and indigenous, and their operations take place in denied territory.[27] The linking of irregular to the guerrilla essentially creates a circumstance where irregular warfare is reflected doctrinally as guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare, in turn, refers to a subset of unconventional warfare (UW). The definition of unconventional warfare in JP 1-02 is, "A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery."[28] This definition raises several questions: 1) Are paramilitary forces and operations regular/conventional or irregular? 2) Is all organization, training, equipping, supporting and directing of surrogates unconventional warfare? 3) What is meant with the introduction of 'surrogate' forces?

Paramilitary forces are "distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission."[29] The initial indication is that paramilitary forces are more regular than irregular and one is left to assume that there is political legitimacy associated with such forces. As such, unconventional warfare assumes the form of regular warfare when employing conventional military forces and/or paramilitary forces that have political legitimacy. Unconventional warfare would be classified as irregular warfare only when U.S. forces are developing guerrillas or insurgents that are seeking political legitimacy.

---

[26] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP1-02*, 278.
[27] Ibid., 231.
[28] Ibid., 558.
[29] Ibid., 402.

The close relationship between irregular warfare and unconventional warfare permits the analysis of irregular warfare by comparing the conventional to the unconventional. A possible definition of conventional war is, "war fought by formally constituted armed forces of a state with the immediate purpose of bringing about the direct physical destruction or incapacitation of the formally constituted armed forces of some other state." [30] Thomas Adams, the Director of Intelligence and Special Operations at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, categorized everything else as unconventional warfare. Adams recognized that such a definition was broader than the DoD usage of the term, but by following such a model all operations could at least be categorized as either conventional or unconventional. Conventional warfare becomes unconventional based upon the status of the belligerent parties or the tactics they employ.[31] It would be tempting to follow Adams' model of describing all operations as either conventional or unconventional. However, DoD's understanding of unconventional warfare is narrower than Adams' and creates a doctrinal gap between these two concepts.

The theme of describing irregular warfare as either a function of the fighting forces or the tactics employed is common to most definitions.[32] Any force involved in armed conflict is capable of adjusting their tactical operations, to some degree, during the course of a conflict. This minimizes the usefulness of using the tactics as the discriminator in determining whether a conflict is regular or irregular. However, the status of a belligerent party tends to remain constant.

[30] Thomas K. Adams, 21.
[31] Ibid.
[32] QDR Irregular Warfare Working Group, (Unpublished Draft, Version 3.1, 23 May 2005) 16.



Figure 1 - Regular or Irregular Warfare

Figure 1, above, shows the relationship between doctrinal military operations that may involve non-U.S. forces and the types of forces typically involved. It also depicts the traditional relationship of conventional and special operations forces to particular missions. The nature of the belligerents is used as the criteria for determining what is regular versus irregular warfare. It is clear that the scope of irregular warfare is inadequate for describing the employment of indigenous forces.

Doctrine

Definitions, no matter how extensive, are not capable of providing the depth of understanding necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the concept of surrogates on the battlefield. A review of defense doctrine as it applies to military operations that involve indigenous or surrogate forces provides further insights on the problem. At the Department of

Defense level, there are very few sources that describe the employment of indigenous forces. The best example, from the Joint Publication series of manuals, is JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*. The most comprehensive sources are the Army's Field Manuals for Army Special Forces. Keeping in mind the limitations of both unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense with respect to the concept of irregular warfare, a review of each is necessary before examining contemporary operations

Unconventional warfare is the operational concept that is the closest to being synonymous with irregular warfare. The highest-level exploration of unconventional warfare is found in the capstone manual for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), FM 100-25. This manual points out two critical aspects of unconventional warfare. First it describes three operational characteristics that refine the broad definition of unconventional warfare. The first relates to battlespace in that unconventional warfare is conducted in "enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory."[33] The second refers to the conduct of unconventional warfare as either guerrilla warfare and/or supporting insurgents. The third aspect is related to the nature of the indigenous partners in unconventional warfare. The doctrine expects them to be an, "existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, or other resistance movements [*sic*]."[34]

Second, FM 100-25 describes the relationship between and the strategic application of military force. The clearest case is when unconventional warfare is employed as a supporting effort to a large-scale war or regional conflict in which the United States has a concurrent conventional campaign. Unconventional warfare can also be applied through an indigenous group to create a deterrent effect. Also, unconventional warfare, in perhaps its purest sense, can be used to support an insurgency.[35] FM 100-25 was last published in August 1999 and covers all

[33] FM 100-25 pg 2-3
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

ARSOF activities. FM 3-05.20 represents an updated, June 2001, and more focused examination of SF operations.

The relevance of SF operations to unconventional warfare is clear from the first paragraph of FM 3-05.20 which states that Special Forces are the, "Army's only unconventional warfare capability."[36] The actual conduct of unconventional warfare is elaborated upon in FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*. This doctrine focuses primarily on different theories of insurgency and the seven phases of unconventional warfare used in a U.S. sponsored insurgency.[37] The narrow scope of UW doctrine makes it difficult to extrapolate its conceptual contributions to other operations involving indigenous or surrogate forces, like foreign internal defense.

The United States recognizes that promoting the security and stability of nations that have common interests is an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy.[38] Foreign internal defense is the primary way in which the United States assists friendly nations when they are facing internal, "subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[39] The U.S. military's role in foreign internal defense can be in the form of indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or U.S. combat operations, but in all cases FID doctrine assumes U.S. forces will assist the host nation's civilian populace and military in accordance with that nation's internal defense and development (IDAD) plan.[40]

The interaction between U.S. forces and the HN forces places foreign internal defense outside of the category of conventional warfare. However, since the preponderance of the training and assistance is directed towards the regular military forces of the host nation, it is not

---

[36] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations*, 1.

[37] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, (Ft. Bragg, NC: US John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, April 2003), 1-1 to 4-5.

[38] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP3-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, (Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 30 April 2004), I-1.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., ix,x. The parenthetical note in the phrase, direct support (not involving combat operations), is derived from the Joint Publication and is not an addition by this author.

appropriate to consider foreign internal defense as irregular warfare. Although the joint doctrine on foreign internal defense is applicable to all of the Department of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been directed by law to provide forces trained and organized to conduct this mission.[41] As a result, with the exception of the procedural peculiarities associated with security assistance and theater security cooperation planning, an understanding of how to operate by, with and through a HN military has remained a niche capability within U.S. special operations forces. The limited nature of the current foreign internal defense construct may not be adequate for the implementation of current U.S. strategy.

The *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* identifies one of the strategic challenges facing the United States as the "irregular challenge" and defines it in terms of the tactics of the adversary.[42] As a result of this challenge one of the U.S. requirements is to increase the capacity of friendly nations to confront and deal with irregular threats.[43] Foreign internal defense is one of the ways in which the United States can improve the military capability of other nations. The scope of the effort envisioned in *The National Defense Strategy* requires resources beyond the special operations community and will demand that the United States incorporate its general-purpose forces (i.e. conventional forces) into the ambiguous world of irregular warfare.[44]

A review of the FID and UW doctrine provides a greater understanding of operations conducted by, with or through an indigenous, surrogate, or partner nation force, than the study of definitions alone. The next step in analyzing irregular warfare is to examine the application of the doctrine to real operations. Doctrine, although authoritative, requires judgment in its application. One should not approach a review of operations in order to criticize how well they

---

[41] Ibid. IV to 1-3.

[42] The Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, March 2005), 3.

[43] Ibid., 7.

[44] Ibid., 14.

follow doctrine, but rather to see what insights can be discovered on the practical conduct of these types of operations.

Contemporary Surrogate Operations

The doctrine reviewed earlier generally evolved from a Cold War understanding of the world in which military operations benefited from at least some semblance of predictability. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the uncertainty of the geo-political environment has been recognized in both strategy and doctrine.[45] The continuous commitment of U.S. military forces overseas since the attacks of September 11th, 2001 provides an opportunity to see if the doctrine and strategy are up to the challenges of current operations. Three contemporary operations lend themselves to exploring the spectrum of indigenous operations. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan, Operations in the Republic of Georgia, and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), combine to represent a range of experience from indirect support foreign internal defense to unconventional warfare to full spectrum operations and counterinsurgency.

Afghanistan

The images of airliners slamming into the twin towers ushered the United States into a new strategic security environment. The claim of responsibility by Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaida, obviated the necessity for a drawn out search for the perpetrators. The mandate from President George W. Bush was to rapidly seek justice.[46] The military response options were a combination of doctrinal tools, organizations and technologies that were already in existence.

---

[45] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2020 and Beyond* 4-6.

[46] George W. Bush, Speech to Joint session of Congress 20 September 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

Planners at all levels were cognizant of the challenges the Soviet Union faced in Afghanistan and wanted an option that would mitigate the risks of a large ground invasion. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) both offered up a series of options to the President.[47] The Central Intelligence Agency assumed risk in its ability to actually topple the Taliban regime that refused to turn bin Laden over to the United States. While DoD's plan took too long to establish adequate conventional combat power in Afghanistan. The combination ultimately adopted would become OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and can be analyzed in two distinct phases. The first phase was from the infiltration of U.S. operatives until the toppling of the Taliban regime. The second phase is ongoing and concerns the establishment of a viable government and security forces while continuing to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda insurgency.

The basis of the CIA plan was to leverage the tribal elements of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. This concept was a perfect fit with the existing SOF concept of unconventional warfare. Special Forces teams infiltrated Afghanistan, rendezvoused with CIA operatives and the guerrilla forces of the Northern Alliance, and began to pressure the Taliban forces. Perfectly fitting with doctrine, the UW campaign was envisioned as being a part of a larger conventional operation. The most effective aspect of this integration was the use of operational fires, in the form of U.S. airpower and precision weapons, by the UW force.

A doctrinal line was crossed however, when U.S. forces created a new guerrilla force of ethnic Pashtuns in order to establish military pressure on the Taliban from the south and counter-balance the political one-sidedness that would have emerged from relying solely on the Northern Alliance. This was contrary to existing UW doctrine, which states that, "SF units do not create

[47] Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 74-92.

resistance movements."[48] This point is not an indictment of the SF units or the campaign, but an illustration that the limits of our existing doctrine may be too narrow.

The use of special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare with indigenous forces, in support of an overall campaign, to topple a hostile regime was the perfect manifestation of SOF UW doctrine. The post-Taliban phases of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM have not been as easy to match to U.S. doctrinal templates. U.S. efforts to rebuild Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban have continued to rely on the use of indigenous Afghans. However, establishment of political control, development of security forces, reconstruction efforts, and the conduct of counterinsurgency operations are all broader than the UW doctrine provides for under the umbrella term "transition."[49]

Thus, the second half of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM relied on a complicated balance between UW tasks and foreign internal defense. By the time the Taliban fell, the United States established a Corps sized headquarters to command and control military operations in Afghanistan. Special operations forces continued the hunt for high-value targets (HVTs). These operations used indigenous forces for force protection and intelligence, thus maintaining some elements of unconventional warfare. However, consistent with the emergence of a central government in Kabul, tribal militias had to be either assimilated into the Afghan security apparatus or demobilized. The creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) demanded a significant effort by the United States and coalition partners to train, equip and advise. This process, as well as the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to assist regional governments develop infrastructure, is more germane to foreign internal defense than to unconventional warfare. The FID doctrine is capable of addressing this level of effort, but not without some challenges. The key point is that three years after the fall of the Taliban, the

[48] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations*, 2-1.
[49] Ibid., 4-1 to 4-3.

commander of special operations forces in Afghanistan saw his mission as unconventional warfare, when foreign internal defense would seem to be the most appropriate.[50]

Republic of Georgia

While commanders in Afghanistan were transitioning between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense in the spring of 2002, another operation was just getting started in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was a U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) operation to increase the stability of the Republic of Georgia, and the region.[51] The program was initiated by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and involved both indirect and direct (not involving combat) types of foreign internal defense.

The strategic demands of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) placed renewed emphasis on helping nations gain control over potential terrorist sanctuaries. The $64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program was the highest strategic priority for European Command at that time.[52] The Georgia Train and Equip Program sought to realize one of the key benefits of foreign internal defense, the commitment of a relatively small force over a long-term program to improve HN capabilities. This operation, in accordance with FID doctrine, combined multiple forms of security assistance and other indirect support with a coordinated direct support effort by EUCOM forces.[53] The overall military contribution was integrated with the internal defense and development strategy.

The Georgia Train and Equip Program did uncover a key challenge to existing FID doctrine. The current doctrinal objective of foreign internal defense is focused on assisting a

---

[50] Walter M. Herd, "Current Unconventional Warfare Capability Versus Future War Requirements," (Research Paper, US Army War College, 2002)

[51] US European Command, (http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/history.asp?pagenum=2), accessed 18 February 2006.

[52] Dean J. Miller, "US Helps Georgia Troops to Fight Terrorism" (http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/jun2002/a060502a.html), accessed 18 February 2006.

[53] U.S. Department of Defense, *JP3-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, I-7.

host nation that is facing internal threats rather than on regional or global security concerns.[54] *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* describes the requirement for the United States to assist those nations who, "are committed to fighting terrorism but lack the capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities."[55] The Georgia Train and Equip, although begun before *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* was published, was focused to this end. The limitations of FID doctrine in this regard required that certain aspects of the Georgia Train and Equip Program were executed in a doctrinal void.

From the perspective of dealing with internal threats the Georgia Train and Equip Program and its current manifestation, Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations, would have received mixed reviews. There have been many successful reforms in the government and the military, as well as increased economic development. Unfortunately, some of the internal strife associated with the secessionist elements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia continues. However when viewed from the broader perspective of creating a surrogate partner in the Global War on Terror, the program has been a resounding success. The Georgians have developed professional units that have deployed to Iraq in support of U.S. and coalition interests and they have decreased the possibility of terrorists establishing a safehaven within their borders.

Iraq

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM began in March of 2003 with the launch of cruise missiles, precision air strikes and the attack of massive armored formations. However, the effort to leverage an indigenous capability in support of U.S. objectives began well before the invasion started. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM provides perhaps the most complicated example of the interaction between U.S. forces and indigenous forces.

---

[54] Ibid., ix.

[55] The White House, *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,* (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2003), 20.

During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S. special operations forces conducted unconventional warfare with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq in order to keep Saddam Hussein from repositioning his northern divisions south around Baghdad.[56] The Kurdish Iraqi resistance movement was well established and much like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan provided a tailor made resistance force that the United States could support and direct. The combat employment of Peshmerga fighters enabled the United States to fix two Iraqi Corps at a cost of two Special Forces battalions. After the end of major combat operations in May of 2003, the UW campaign moved into the transition and demobilization phase.

Demobilization is doctrinally described as the, "most difficult, and most sensitive phase of UW operations."[57] This was especially true in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM for two key reasons. First, the Kurdish resistance movement was ethnically distinct from the remainder of the Iraqi population. This fact combined with the historical tension between the Kurds and the Arab regime in Baghdad created an environment of extreme mutual distrust. Second, the ability of the newly established Iraqi government to take control of armed factions was limited or non-existent. This left the responsibility for controlling militias, of all ethnic elements, to the coalition forces.

Additionally, the coalition forces found themselves facing an increasingly robust insurgency that required the assistance of the indigenous population to confront. Fighting an insurgency requires a significant contribution from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. This forced the coalition to continue unconventional warfare with their indigenous partners. At the same time there was a necessity to establish a sovereign government that could assimilate these formations and develop an internal defense and development strategy that could accommodate foreign internal defense operations.

---

[56] Gregory Fontenot, et al, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 78.

[57] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations,*1-18.

On June 30, 2004 the United States turned over sovereignty of Iraq to the Iraqi Interim Government. While not changing the practical requirements for the coalition to continue to conduct counterinsurgency operations, this signified a doctrinal shift in the nature of U.S. operations vis-à-vis the Iraqi forces. U.S. support of the new government would be manifested in the form of foreign internal defense rather than unconventional warfare. Two challenges emerged at this point. First, FID counterinsurgency operations envision an established, even if limited, security apparatus for the nation receiving assistance. This structure should be capable of providing the intelligence support to the operation. This is critical because the intelligence activities doctrinally associated with foreign internal defense are much more limited than those traditionally aligned with unconventional warfare.[58]

Second, although FID doctrine repeatedly emphasizes the unique role special operations forces play in foreign internal defense, the magnitude of the training assistance required in Iraq eclipsed the SOF capacity. There are well over one hundred battalions of Iraqi forces that will be trained in Iraq.[59] U.S. forces developed a conventional (i.e. non-special operations) force capability to contribute to the enormous FID task. This capability is in the form of a headquarters, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), and a robust collection of Coalition Military Assistance Training Teams (CMATT).[60] Regardless of whether one considers foreign internal defense as irregular warfare or not, the significant contribution of conventional forces to the mission demanded that the employment of indigenous forces be expanded beyond the special operations community.

An additional complication facing the coalition in Iraq is the necessity to integrate a wide array of coalition partners. Army Special Forces apply their UW skills to integrate coalition

---

[58] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.201: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 3-28 to 3-33 and U.S. Department of Defense, *JP3-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),*V-3.

[59]Multi-National Forces – Iraq, (http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm.)

[60] Ibid.

forces into combined operations.[61] Coalition support operations are absent, appropriately so, from FID doctrine. However, the reality is that SF units are integrating the contributions of several nations into Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and they are doing so with no clear doctrinal framework for their operations.

Irregular warfare remains a popular term to describe a wide range of conflict, essentially being a concept to describe combat that is anything other than two conventional armies conducting fire and maneuver against each other. The operations mentioned earlier often inherit the label of irregular or unconventional. However, few of these operations were irregular warfare in the sense that there were irregular forces being employed by the United States. Irregular warfare is narrower in scope than the common usage of the term indicates. Essentially, irregular warfare is found only as a subset of unconventional warfare. There were significant portions of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM that involved unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare, and to an even greater extent, irregular warfare, are not conceptually adequate to describe the range of U.S. operations involving indigenous forces. The United States needs an updated concept that addresses the use of foreign entities, regular and irregular, in U.S. military operations.

[61] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations*, 2-6 and 2-21.

Chapter 3: SURROGATE WARFARE

What do the Northern Alliance, the Pashtun tribal militias, the Kurdish Peshmerga fighter, army and ministry of interior police units from the Republic of Georgia, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces have in common? They are not all unconventional warfare forces and they are not all the targets of foreign internal defense -- the two operational frameworks available. They are definitely not all irregular forces. However, they are all foreign and they are all involved in combating terrorism and counterinsurgency operations with the United States in pursuit of U.S. objectives. They are all fulfilling roles that the United States either does not have the capability or the will to do with U.S. forces. They are all surrogate forces.

Surrogate: An Updated Concept for a Contemporary World

The concept of using surrogates is not new to U.S. warfare. However, the guidance for how the U.S. incorporates surrogate forces into its military guidance is incomplete. Updating the concept of surrogate warfare and integrating it in a useful manner into U.S. strategy, policy, and doctrine will increase the effective options available to future military and national security planners. This enhanced concept of surrogate warfare will close the doctrinal gap that exists under the constructs of regular versus irregular, and conventional versus unconventional warfare.

A surrogate, in its simplest sense, takes the place of something or someone.[62] The surrogate is also a proxy for a particular function or set of functions. The word surrogate is not meant to be pejorative, but rather an expression that conveys substitution of one for another. Generally, it implies that the surrogate is acting on behalf of the interests of another, and is in some way distinct from the source of its authority to act. It is possible, in fact probable, that the surrogate will have interests of its own as well.

[62] Frank R. Abate, 807.

The United States use of surrogates has ranged from the employment of a few individuals with special skills to entire armies, and from the founding of the nation to the most recent conflicts. The fight for independence from Great Britain was the baptism of the U.S. Army. This initial conflict included a heavy reliance on surrogates. The U.S. depended heavily on the French, both its forces in Canada and its navy, as it organized itself to repel the British Army.[63] In the century after independence, the fledgling army supported the U.S. expansion to the west by fighting wars against Mexico and the Native Americans. The use of surrogates was limited during these frontier clashes, but there were many instances in which the U.S. Army relied upon guides and translators from sympathetic or coerced Indians.

In the brutal fighting against Filipino guerrillas during the Philippine War of 1899 – 1902, U.S. forces were continuously handicapped by their inability to penetrate ethnic tribal areas. One example of successful employment of surrogates was the creation of the Macabebe Scouts, an indigenous force that was opposed to the pro-independence guerrillas. The Macabebe Scouts took the place of U.S. Army forces that could not gain access to enemy strongholds.[64]

During the turmoil in Nicaragua from 1926 to 1933, Nicaraguan guardsmen served as surrogate partners with U.S. Marines against the liberal rebel group, led by Augusto Sandino, in Nicaragua in 1927.[65] The relationship between the Marines and the indigenous forces made certain that Sandino was seen as fighting his own countrymen instead of resisting an American occupation.

The allied forces in the Second World War sought out surrogate forces that could provide strategic challenges for the axis powers or serves conduct economy of force operations for the allies. The peak of U.S. surrogate warfare was during World War II. The Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the forerunner of modern Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, was

---

[63] Center of Military History, American *Military History,* (), 56-60.
[64] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace,* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 118.
[65] Ibid., 234-244.

responsible for U.S. surrogate operations. OSS teams trained, advised, and assisted French resistance elements, and also partisan forces in Yugoslavia in an organized effort against German forces. OSS Detachment 101 developed and employed surrogates against the Japanese in Burma by building a guerrilla army of native tribesmen.[66]

Despite the historical significance of surrogate warfare, the current U.S. policy guidance on surrogates is decidedly lacking. The DoD dictionary does not define the term surrogate or surrogate warfare. The term, surrogate, finds its way into current doctrine as an element within the definition of unconventional warfare. In this context, unconventional warfare is the use of either indigenous or surrogate forces. The Army's manual on Special Forces Operations simply defines a surrogate as, "someone who takes the place of or acts for another."[67]

The best way to redefine surrogate, in terms of establishing a framework of warfare, is to take a more comprehensive approach that incorporates contemporary operational realities. A surrogate is an entity outside of the Department of Defense (i.e. indigenous to the location of the conflict, from a third country, partner nation, alliance, or from another U.S. organization) that performs specific functions that assist in the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ. This new definition accounts for the wide range of forces and relationships that the United States may leverage in pursuit of national policy objectives. It also recognizes that in many cases there may be entities outside of the U.S. military that have superior capability in certain functions, or are preferred because of political factors.

The use of a substitute force is the defining characteristic of surrogate warfare. There are a wide variety of reasons the United States may establish a partnership with a surrogate. Likewise, there are many types of surrogates. Also, surrogate warfare can be conducted against the entire spectrum of adversaries.

---

[66] Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, 8-10.
[67] FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, 2-5.

The use of surrogates may benefit the United States in a number of ways. Political legitimacy is one of the must fundamental reasons for seeking to include non-U.S. forces in operations. The involvement of external forces, which take the place of additional U.S. forces, establishes a broader base of political support for military intervention. The desire for legitimacy can range from the strengthening of existing alliances, as in the NATO operations in Kosovo, to the building of specific coalitions, as in OPERATION DESERT STORM and the War on Terror.

Another fundamental value of including surrogates is that it reduces the demand on U.S. forces. This is especially true when including regular military forces from industrialized partners. The inclusion of NATO airplanes in the bombing campaign in Kosovo, reduced the number of U.S. aircraft that needed to be used. Similarly, the contributions of coalition forces in Iraq lowered the requirement for U.S. forces, a critical benefit that allowed the United States to sustain the current level of operations.

An often-overlooked reason to use surrogate forces is that they may provide capabilities that the United States does not have. The superiority of U.S. military forces is widely acknowledged and seems to contradict the notion that someone else has a capability that the United States does not. The most significant contribution of a surrogate may be their ethnicity, language, or culture. Conflict in the 21st Century is increasingly likely to involve ethnic or cultural disputes in regions of the world vastly different than the western culture of the United States. The ability to use surrogates to connect with the populations and gain their support, as well as provide a better understanding of the culture, is an important reason to consider surrogate warfare as a military option.[68]

A surrogate is not inherently inferior to the sponsor. Surrogates can range from the most advanced military forces in the world to third-world tribal militias. It is also possible for the United States to be used as a surrogate force by others. The heavy reliance by many nations on

[68] Brian L. Thompson, "Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force," (Research Paper: Naval War College, 2002), 3.

U.S. intelligence and communications support, especially space-based systems, is an example of this. The frequent employment of U.S. strategic lift to move peacekeeping forces in support of the United Nations or the African Union is another. The concept of surrogate warfare is not contingent upon the quantitative or qualitative value of the foreign force but rather on the relationship between the sponsor and the surrogate.

The concepts of irregular or unconventional warfare are overly focused on the tactics employed by the forces involved. Surrogate warfare is defined as being independent from the tactical approaches used by the surrogate force. Many of what are commonly considered irregular tactics: guerrilla warfare, support to insurgencies, sabotage and subversion, and intelligence activities, can be conducted under the umbrella of surrogate warfare. However, surrogate warfare can also include high technology precision strikes and combined arms maneuver warfare.

Surrogate warfare also avoids the trap of defining warfare based on the tactics of the enemy. The current interpretation of irregular warfare is based in large part on the adversary tactics. Specifically, if the enemy is using irregular tactics, then from a U.S. perspective it is irregular warfare.[69] Given this framework, the launching of cruise missiles against al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, in response to the bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa, is irregular warfare. One can adopt this definitional framework but it is of little use for formulating U.S. policy or doctrine on the employment of non-U.S. forces. Additionally, an adaptive enemy is likely to change its tactics during a conflict thus exacerbating the difficulties in understanding the operational environment. Surrogate warfare focuses on the elements of conflict that the U.S. can control, the inclusion of surrogate forces or not, and provides a solid foundation for the development of guidance for surrogate warfare against all types of adversary.

[69] Department of the Army, *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations, 57.*.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of a new understanding of surrogate warfare is the impact of the concept of U.S. sponsor force involvement. The existing guidance generally portrays a continuum in which the more irregular a conflict -- remembering the problems with this interpretation -- the greater the reliance on special operations forces. U.S. special operations forces have critical roles to play when the United States conducts operations by, with, and through foreign forces. However, the U.S. can maximize the effectiveness of its surrogate warfare operations by including the extensive capabilities of conventional forces in an appropriate balance of forces.



Figure 2 - Surrogate Warfare

Figure 2 illustrates that the concept of surrogate warfare provides a comprehensive framework that includes all the potential non-U.S. forces that may be employed in operations that

support U.S. national interest. The level of involvement of U.S. conventional and special operations forces is no longer just a function of the type of operation. The graph across the top of Figure 2 illustrates that there are requirements for special operations and conventional forces in all types of military operations. The level of effort required of each force needs to be determined not just on the type of operation but also by the characteristics of the surrogate environment.

Right Force, Right Place, Right Time

The concept of surrogate warfare expands the potential U.S. forces that will be associated with surrogate operations, beyond just special operations forces. This will provide a broader range of options to strategic planners. As a result, there must be a model to evaluate options and make recommendations so that the right (i.e. most appropriate) U.S. force is employed based on the characteristics of the potential surrogate operations. Recognizing that the distinction between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces has been an historic difference, criteria should be designed to inform the selection of the U.S. force to use. The factors most appropriate to making this decision are the nature of the potential surrogate, the types of operations the surrogate is expected to conduct, the austerity of the physical environment, the threat level of the operational environment, and the political sensitivities associated with the proposed operations.

Potential surrogates range from modern, allied armies to revolutionary, third world individuals. Where on this continuum a surrogate in a proposed operation falls is critical for determining the ways the United States will use to integrate the surrogate effort. In particular, the nature of the surrogate will be one of the factors for selecting the appropriate U.S. force to conduct the surrogate operation. There are two key variables in describing a potential surrogate -- the level of military organization and the level of control.

The requirements to conduct operations with a surrogate organized into a recognized military structure (i.e. companies, battalions, support units, etc.) are clearly different than organizing and employing the elements of a resistance movement (i.e. guerillas, underground,

auxiliary). In general the greater the level of military organization of the surrogate, the greater the range of U.S. forces capable of executing the surrogate operation. However, if the surrogate does not resemble a conventional military force, it is likely that special operations forces will be the preferred force to leverage the surrogate capability.

In a similar vein, the decision of what type of U.S. force to assign the surrogate warfare mission to is informed by the level of control exercised over the surrogate. Control can be in the form of direct legal or political means or as a result of the degree of shared interests between the surrogate and the sponsor. Regardless of its source, a higher degree of control is desired in order for conventional forces, especially at the small unit level, to be able to operate by, with, and through a surrogate partner.

Another factor is the types of operations that the surrogate force either needs to be trained in or the mission requirements that placed upon the surrogate. U.S. forces are incredibly proficient in a wide range of skills. However, conventional and special operations forces each have their areas of expertise. Planners must be cognizant of the expected operational tasks to be executed by the surrogate force and any associated training requirements. U.S. surrogate warfare capacity is limited if the entire range of DoD assets are not considered for employment. Special operations forces are the preeminent trainers of foreign fighters. However, there are many military functions that could be more effectively trained and advised by non-SOF units. Brigade level combined arms operations, theater logistics, and peace support operations are but a few examples of surrogate operations that conventional units might conduct.

The physical environment is another factor for evaluating the assignment of forces to a surrogate warfare operation. Even as the U.S. military transforms into an expeditionary force, most units require the establishment of significant logistical infrastructure to sustain them. Tactical formations are designed to integrate into an echeloned system capable of providing everything from basic life support and maintenance to medical care. These logistical challenges can be reduced if there is sufficient infrastructure in the host nation, especially in non-combat

surrogate operations. Austere environments without a robust local infrastructure require self-supportable units to conduct training or operations. The SF A-team represents the special operations forces' answer to operation in austere environments. The decision of whether to deploy an A-team or a company of instructors from a school depends in large measure to the level of support available either from the host nation or other U.S. military units in the area of operations.

The operational environment includes more than just physical elements. The threat situation has a direct and significant impact on surrogate operations. Force protection is a continuous concern for U.S. military forces working overseas. However, the requirements are protection requirements are different for a unit conducting foreign internal defense in a permissive environment than for one organizing and employing a resistance force in a denied area or for the integration of a coalition battalion in major combat operations. The threat can differ both in magnitude and in kind. The former is the probability that an adversary can harm U.S. forces or their operations. The latter is a complex combination of enemy military, police and intelligence forces and the level of hostility of the civilian population.

The U.S. sponsor must be capable of addressing these threats. In some cases host nation security forces can provide adequate security. In other cases the sponsor finds force protection with the surrogate itself or by operating in a clandestine manner. Another option is for the United States to deploy with enough combat power to deter hostile forces and if deterrence fails to defeat the threat. There is no singular answer as to which U.S. forces are best suited to a particular threat situation. However, special operations forces generally do not have the firepower to defeat large-scale threats -- without relying on the surrogate force -- but instead use stealth and cultural awareness to reduce vulnerabilities. Conversely, if large conventional formations have already been introduced to an area of operations, they can assist in protecting sponsor units.

The relationship between politics and war is not new and surrogate warfare is not isolated from this bond. Rather, surrogate operations are even more susceptible to political influences.

U.S., adversary, and international political interests, as well as the surrogate interests, are all competing in the strategic environment. The sensitivity of this political environment is an important factor for considering the DoD surrogate sponsor.

The wake of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq leaves a potentially diminished political will, domestically and internationally for the commitment of significant U.S. military forces, for unilateral or surrogate operations. Additionally, a high operations tempo has limited the U.S. force pool available for extended operations. In such circumstances the lower signature of small SOF elements, which have established a long precedence of foreign deployments, may be a much more politically feasible option. The United States may prefer the use of larger, more visible options in cases where the demonstration of U.S. resolve or deterrence is the desired effect.



Figure 3 - U.S. Force Employment Criteria

Conventional forces and special operations forces each have capabilities and limitations that make them better suited for certain surrogate warfare operations. Figure 3 depicts the relationship of these capabilities and limitations with respect to five significant elements of the surrogate warfare environment. The chart depicts the most suitable force to serve as a surrogate sponsor given the characteristics of a particular element.

Special operations forces provide the tailored capability for U.S. surrogate warfare when the surrogate force is a fledgling resistance organization or in a FID environment in which the organization and governmental control of the military is weak. It also takes SOF capabilities to train surrogates to do special operations or to operate for extended periods of time in denied territory. Special operations forces have been manned, trained and equipped, in ways that allow them to sustain themselves and their operations without the assistance of HN or U.S. logistics. This makes them suitable to lead surrogate warfare operations in austere environments. The low-visibility and clandestine capability of special operations forces also provides them with unique force protection options in high threat areas when U.S. combat power is limited or non-existent. Finally, the same low-visibility capability supports the employment of special operations forces should political sensitivities preclude the deployment of larger, more overt U.S. formations.

Conventional forces can lend their significant capabilities to surrogate warfare as well. The sheer numbers of conventional forces, relative to special operations forces, implies that there is a deep pool of potential surrogate trainers. Conventional forces are very capable of working with a surrogate force that is organized in a recognizable military fashion and is responsive to the control of the government. In many cases the surrogate training requirements can be met with conventional force trainers. Basic military training, small-unit tactics, stability operations, and staff functions are all well within the realm of conventional force expertise, and the United States should seek to leverage that expertise whenever possible. A limitation of conventional forces is their sustainment requirements. However, if the proposed surrogate warfare environment

mitigates this limitation either through HN infrastructure and support or the existing or desired presence of U.S. logistical support then conventional forces may serve as a surrogate sponsor.

In many areas of the world the threat to U.S. forces of any size is fairly low. In such cases conventional forces can operate freely in relatively small numbers to accomplish foreign internal defense or other surrogate operations. Higher threat areas require either a commitment of HN security forces or perhaps U.S. combat forces to protect the conventional force sponsor. The idea that nothing sends a political message like the deployment of a Marine Expeditionary Unit speaks to the last element of the surrogate warfare environment. The U.S. interest may be best served by demonstrating resolve to an ally by using visible conventional forces to increase the interoperability and enhance the surrogate's capability. Conventional forces are more effective in these demonstration or deterrent political situations.

Seldom will all of the elements of a potential surrogate operation imply either a pure special operations or conventional force solution. The challenge for planners is to recognize that all of the elements must be considered and prioritized to determine the best mix of U.S. forces to conduct the surrogate warfare operation.

Chapter 4: CONCLUSION

The U.S. military's latest attempt to categorize conflict has emphasized the distinction between regular and irregular warfare. The United States distinguishes these two types of warfare based upon the participation of irregular forces or the utilization of irregular tactics by either belligerent. This framework permits the description of U.S. unilateral conventional operations as irregular solely on the basis of an irregularity of some enemy tactical choices. Even more troubling is that such a model describes the inclusion of a third-party nation's military forces in a coalition as regular warfare if the threat is operating as a conventional military force. The inadequacies of this approach are exacerbated because the preponderance of irregular warfare concept development and operations are relegated to special operations forces. U.S. special operations forces possess significant capabilities in waging irregular warfare, but U.S. conventional forces do also. The future will demand perhaps unprecedented, U.S. reliance on the participation of indigenous forces in their military operations.[70] The presence or absence of non-U.S. forces is a critical distinguishing characteristic that is not recognized in the regular versus irregular warfare model. This shortfall must be rectified in order for the United States to maximize the benefits of including foreign forces into military planning.

The U.S. military has endured the significant demands of the first five years of the war on terror. These operational requirements have diminished the U.S. capacity to respond to strategic requirements beyond the near-term objectives of the war on terror. Additionally, the strains on the international and domestic political environment as a result of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM have reduced the U.S. freedom of action. Simultaneously, there are many countries in the world that are either unwilling (lack the desire) or unable (lack the capability) to control their territory, thus providing the potential for terrorist sanctuary or the escalation of regional

[70] United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2020 and Beyond*, 4-10.

conflict. The enemies of the United States are fully capable of recognizing and exploiting this strategic situation. The effective employment of surrogate forces can contribute significantly to the U.S. ability to counter these threats and accomplish its strategic objectives.

The ability to integrate foreign partners, of all types, into U.S. operations is not just a requirement for the future but is a present day reality. Relying on their professionalism and adaptability, U.S. forces are "figuring it out on the ground" when it comes to leveraging the strengths of surrogate forces and mitigating their weaknesses. The effectiveness of U.S. units would be greatly enhanced, and their efforts would produce greater strategic benefit, if the Department of Defense developed comprehensive guidance on surrogate warfare. The objectives of U.S. strategy and policy and a doctrinal methodology for conducting surrogate operations are not currently synchronized. The existing guidance is a convoluted set of terms and operations that alternate between a focus on the organization of the indigenous forces and their tactics.

A review of contemporary U.S. military operations illustrates the lack of a comprehensive approach to incorporating surrogates into the effort. The majority of the guidance for dealing with surrogate forces is found in the doctrine for unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. If the surrogate is a modern military power, joint doctrine addresses their integration into a coalition organization. Foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition warfare are restricted to relatively narrow sets of circumstances and they are viewed as distinct operations without a conceptual linkage between them. The reliance on special operations forces for the conduct of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare, combined with majority of the guidance on coalition warfare focused at the Joint Task Force level, reinforces the segregation of these operations. The totality of these circumstances results in an unfortunate limiting of U.S. options for using foreign forces.

The concept of surrogate warfare overcomes the incompleteness of irregular warfare, establishes a conceptual linkage between existing doctrinal operations, and provides a comprehensive range of options for strategic planners. It also facilitates the expansion of the

discussion and the preparation of forces to employ surrogates beyond just special operations forces. The codification of surrogate warfare can be informed by the historical uses of foreign forces by the U.S. military and is consistent with that history as well as the predictions for future operations.

Surrogate warfare is the conduct of operations by, with, or through an entity outside of the U.S. military that performs specific functions that assist in the accomplishment of U.S. military objectives by taking the place of capabilities that the U.S. military either does not have or does not desire to employ. The key to surrogate warfare is that it is defined by the inclusion of a force on behalf of the United States and not on the tactics or type of organization of one of the belligerents. Surrogate warfare is conceptually broad enough to provide guidance for the integration of any foreign entity, without being vulnerable to the wavering of enemy tactics.

A holistic approach to surrogate warfare will allow the United States to better reap the benefits of operating with proxies. One of the most significant benefits is the increased likelihood of gaining political legitimacy for the operation itself. Another advantage is the practical savings in terms of U.S. lives, treasure, and operations tempo when partners are enlisted to share the burdens of warfare. The widely acknowledged importance of civilian populations in future conflicts alludes to another advantage of incorporating foreign forces into U.S. campaigns. Surrogate forces that are indigenous to the country or regions of conflict possess inherent cultural and language capabilities that the United States cannot replicate. This leads to both increased operational effectiveness and increased potential for civilian support.

In order to gain these benefits, the previous paradigm of relegating the surrogate operation to special operations forces must be broken. A holistic approach to surrogate warfare seeks to leverage the advantages of conventional and special operations forces by applying them to the most appropriate surrogate operations. Instead of categorizing the operational environment as regular or irregular and employing conventional or special operations forces respectively, a surrogate warfare operation has several elements each of which contribute to determining the

appropriate U.S. force to use for integrating the surrogate. These elements account for the level of organization and control of the proposed surrogate, the envisioned training and operational requirements of the surrogate, the infrastructure available to support the U.S. sponsor, the threat against U.S. forces, and the political sensitivity of the operation. The establishment of surrogate warfare guidance for the entire U.S. military permits the employment of both conventional and special operations forces consistent with the demands of the environment while maintaining unity of effort.

Surrogate warfare is part of the history of the United States and will certainly be part of its future. The development of comprehensive guidance on the use of surrogates will allow the United States to realize the significant benefits of conducting operations by, with, and through our partners around the world. Embracing surrogate warfare does not prevent or degrade the United States from acting unilaterally. Rather, it may increase the ability to act unilaterally when required by preserving political capital and national resources. Surrogate warfare expands the options available for the United States in pursuit of its national interests.

Chapter 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States is not going to realize the benefits of surrogate warfare spontaneously. A deliberate, comprehensive implementation of surrogate warfare guidance is a necessary condition for changing the way that the U.S. military conducts operations by, with, and through surrogate forces. There are concurrent aspects of incorporating surrogate warfare into future U.S. military operations. The first is to recognize the uniqueness of a surrogate and establish joint definitions for these substitute forces and for surrogate warfare. The next is to establish a doctrinal foundation for surrogate warfare operations. This new joint doctrine needs to provide both a single reference to address the key elements of how to conduct surrogate warfare with the joint force and the integration of relevant surrogate warfare impacts on other joint operations. Third, the Department of Defense needs to establish policies that describe the use of surrogates. This includes, but is not limited to, the sharing of information and technology, aspects of interagency coordination that are unique to working with foreign forces, assignment of proponents, and budgeting and programming guidance. Finally, security strategies at the national and defense levels need to refine the objectives and desired effects of employing surrogate forces in support of national objectives.

Planning for the future requires an understanding of potential adversaries and the tactics that they may use against the United States. However, guidance should be directed towards those elements of warfare that are within U.S. control. The Department of Defense must make the philosophical shift from irregular warfare, as a framework for informing U.S. operations, to surrogate warfare, thereby directing those things that it can control, while continuing to recognize the range of threats presented by future adversaries.

The best place to begin developing a U.S. surrogate warfare understanding is as one of Joint Staff's Joint Operating Concepts. This level of integration will prevent surrogate warfare from being marginalized into a service or force specific concept. Also, the relationship between

the Joint Operating Concepts and transformation planning will provide the degree of emphasis and visibility necessary for rapid implementation of surrogate warfare. The experimental and future focus of this family of concepts is appropriate for the development of new approaches to warfare.

Experimentation is another area that the U.S. military can investigate the challenges and opportunities of surrogate warfare. The Department of Defense experimentation, modeling, and exercise communities can provide valuable insight into the use of surrogates. An increased focus on the impact of surrogates on U.S. operations, force structures, and technological advancement, and vice-versa, will assist the development of effective policy, strategy, and doctrine. Additionally, if leaders and units are forced to explore the role of surrogates in exercise scenarios they will become more comfortable with the potential of surrogate warfare and more likely consider surrogate operations in real-world planning situations.

The dissemination of the surrogate warfare concept is critical in order to achieve the desired benefits. Carefully and thoughtfully crafted guidance is of no value if the interested parties are not aware of it. There are two critical audiences for the spread of U.S. surrogate warfare guidance. The first and most obvious is the U.S. military force as a whole. This includes strategic planners that need to know the U.S. approach to surrogate warfare and incorporate it as one of the strategic options. Theater and operational level commanders need to continuously shape their environments to preserve and as necessary develop potential surrogate warfare options. Tactical units and force providers need to know the potential capabilities they will need in order to operate by, with, and through surrogate forces.

Another vital audience is the international community of potential surrogates. The United States wants to preserve the widest possible range of future surrogates. This can only be accomplished if foreign entities understand that being a surrogate is not a pejorative or inferior status. The United States must preserve, in the development of surrogate warfare guidance, the valuable contribution of surrogates and the shared interests and mutual benefits of conducting

operations with the United States. Surrogates are not blind to the geo-political environment and can determine the how their participation supports U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States must likewise remain sensitive to the interests of the surrogate and recognize the limitations that accompany the employment of the surrogate when these interests are not identical. The surest way to corrupt the value of surrogate warfare is for the United States to be perceived as abusing their surrogates.

The U.S. global hegemony is both powerful and precarious. Conflict in the 21st century is likely to be fought for a more diverse set of reasons and in more diverse settings than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. These two factors provide tremendous opportunity for the United States, and imply unprecedented risks. The development of comprehensive, integrated surrogate warfare strategies and capabilities, and prudent dissemination of these to U.S. forces and their partners can maximize the opportunities and mitigate the risks. The United States can win in the 21st century by operating by, with, and through surrogate forces.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Thomas K. *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare.* Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998.

Abate, Frank R. editor. *Oxford Pocket Dictionary and Thesaurus.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Bank, Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces. New York: Pocket Books, 1986.

Barnett, Robert W. *The Sinews of National Military Strategy.* Boston, MA: United States Strategic Institute, 1994.

Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998.

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Boyatt, Mark D. "Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations." Special Warfare, Autumn, 1994.

Cavallaro, Gina. "Small teams, Big Job." Army Times, 6 February 2006: 8-10.

Carroll, Douglas E. "Special Forces Doctrine and Army Operations Doctrine." M.M.A.S. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Dickson, Keith. "The New Asymmetry: Unconventional Warfare and Army Special Forces." Special Warfare (Fall 2001): 14-19.

Dillon, G.M. *Defence Policy a Comparative Analysis.* Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1988.

Fondacaro, Steve A. "AirLand Battle and SOF: A Proposal for an Interim Doctrine for Joint Special Operations." M.M.A.S. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1989.

Fontenot, Gregory, et al. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.* Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Strategy: The Indirect Approach.* London: Faber and Faber, 1946.

Herd, Walter M. "Current Unconventional Warfare Capability Versus Future War Requirements." Research Paper. U.S. Army War College, 2002.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.

Jackson, Derrick Z. "Bush Follows Johnson's Logic," *The Boston Globe.* 22 March 2006.

Jones, Gary M and Christopher Tone. "Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces." Special Warfare, Winter, 1999, 1-13.

Kelley, Robert E. "U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or Relic of the Past?" Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, 2000.

Kershner, Michael R. “Special Forces in Unconventional Warfare.” Military Review, January-February, 2001, 1-4.

Manwaring, Max G., ed. Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Maxwell, David S. “Special Forces Missions: A Return to the Past for a Vision of the Future.” M.M.A.S. Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 1995.

Metzgar Greg E. “Unconventional Warfare: A Mission Metamorphosis For The 21st Century.” Student thesis. U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2000.

Motley, James B. “US Unconventional Conflict Policy and Strategy.” Military Review, vol 70, no. 1, 1990, 2-16.

Murray, Williamson and Macgregor Knox. “Thinking About Revolutions in Warfare,” *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050,* edited by Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Ott, Paul A. “Unconventional Warfare in the Contemporary Operational Environment: Transforming Special Forces.” M.M.A.S. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2002.

Robinson, Linda. *Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces.* New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman. *The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take a Hero.* New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Sullivan, David M. “Transforming America’s Military: Integrating Unconventional Ground Forces Intro Combat Air Operations.” Research paper, U.S. Naval War College, 2002.

The White House. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1981. Available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo12333.htm.

_____. National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Washington, DC: The White House, 2003.

_____. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, 2003.

10 U.S.C. § 167, Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces.

Thompson, Brian L. “Surrogate Armies: Redefining the Ground Force.” Research paper. U.S. Naval War College, 2002.

Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. 6th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

U.K. Ministry of Defense. Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines). London: Ministry of Defense, 2001.

U.S. Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02, Joint Doctrine Development System, Final Coordinating Draft. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003.

_____.Bottom-Up Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993.

_____.Department of the Army. *FM 3-05.20: Special Forces Operations.* Ft. Bragg, NC: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, June 2001.

_____.Department of the Army. *FM 3-05.201: Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations.* Ft. Bragg, NC: US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, April 2003.

_____. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Volume I, Policy, Concepts, and Procedures. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1986.

_____. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 20, Unconventional Warfare, Volume II. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1983.

_____.Joint Forces Command. *The Joint Operational Environment: The World Through 2020 and Beyond.* Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM J2, August 2005.

_____.*Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 21 August 2005.

_____. *Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003.

_____. *Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID),* Suffolk, VA: USJFCOM, 30 April 2004.

_____. Joint Vision 2020. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2000.

_____. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001.

_____. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1998.

_____. U.S. Special Operations Command. Posture Statement 2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terror. McDill Air Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2003.

_____. U.S. Special Operations Command. Posture Statement 2001. McDill Air Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2001.

_____. U.S. Special Operations Command. Posture Statement 2000. McDill Air Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2000.

_____. U.S. Special Operations Command. Posture Statement 1998. McDill Air Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 1998.

Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.